Daring to Denuclearize: Regional Quests to Ban the Bomb
Book manuscript in preparation
There are currently eight nuclear-weapon-free zones in existence: Three for the uninhabited “final frontiers” of Antarctica, outer space, and the seabed, and five for the inhabited regions of Africa, Central Asia, Latin America, Southeast Asia, and the South Pacific. My book project presents an international history of these zones. Utilizing archival research from around the world, it seeks to understand the geostrategic and geopolitical factors that have led to proposals for regional denuclearization and determined their outcome. It highlights the role of proposals for regional denuclearization in key epochs of the Cold War and helps further our understanding of how nuclear and non-nuclear states shaped the global nuclear order.
Peer-Reviewed Publications
“Artificial Intelligence and the Future of Nuclear Weapons,” in Governance, Oxford Intersections: AI in Society. Ed. Margaret Hu and Charlton McIlwain. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, forthcoming.
Artificial intelligence (AI) is rapidly reshaping the global security landscape, introducing profound opportunities and risks. As technological innovation outpaces governance frameworks, states are grappling with how to responsibly integrate AI into systems as sensitive and consequential as nuclear weapons. At present, countries are actively exploring AI’s integration into early warning systems, decision support frameworks, and even strategic deterrence postures. These developments raise urgent questions about strategic stability, human oversight, and the risks of misuse or miscalculation in the midst of high-pressure decision-making. Addressing these challenges requires a deep understanding of AI’s risks and opportunities in the nuclear domain. This chapter examines these issues through two primary lenses: the influence of AI on nuclear proliferation, including its potential to both accelerate and restrict the spread of nuclear weapons; and AI’s impact on nuclear decision-making, with an emphasis on deterrence dynamics, human oversight, and the risks of inadvertent escalation. The incorporation of AI into nuclear systems represents a turning point in international security. By understanding its risks and benefits, policymakers can develop strategies to harness AI’s capabilities while mitigating its dangers. The stakes are extremely high, and the need for thoughtful governance has never been more urgent.
“‘More Flags’ Meets Failure: Brazil, the United States, and the Vietnam War,” The International History Review (June 2024, early view), 1-19.
As part of its ‘more flags’ campaign, the United States wanted Brazil to fight in the Vietnam War. No Latin American country mattered more to the U.S. effort. The United States considered leveraging an economic loan, naval vessels, and a prioritization of Brazil in inter-American affairs. Many Brazilian officials liked the idea of a greater military presence in Vietnam. They hoped to gain valuable counterrevolutionary experience in a tropical setting akin to their own, curry favor with the United States, and acquire new military technology. Brazil’s greatest proposal centered on a request for modern naval destroyers that would see Brazil baited into combat. But public opinion, self-imposed restrictions, and key individuals ultimately doomed the prospects for Brazil’s entry. This article helps to further internationalize our understanding of the Vietnam War and situate Latin America within the broader context of the global Cold War. It adds to our understanding of the limits that existed in U.S.-Latin American relations, the U.S. commitment to multi-lateralizing its military campaign in Vietnam, and the political capacity of Brazil’s military dictatorship at home.
“‘A question of survival’: Canada and the Rapacki Plan for the denuclearisation of Central Europe, 1957–59,” Cold War History, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Fall 2021): 509–31.
In October 1957, Poland proposed the Rapacki Plan for the denuclearisation of Central Europe. While North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members attacked the initiative, Canada viewed it as a means to ease Cold War tensions. Although Canada joined with its allies to reject the Plan, it embarked on a quest for counterproposals to restrain NATO nuclear sharing and reduce the chances of nuclear war. Canada’s efforts alarmed Western allies and helped lead to a second Rapacki Plan. Overall, this article details Canada’s struggle to assert itself as a middle power and provides a robust example of Western interest in the Rapacki Plan.
“Antarctic arms control as past precedent,” Polar Record, Vol. 55, No. 5 (September 2019): 330–3.
The 1959 Antarctic Treaty made Antarctica the world’s first and only demilitarised continent, the world’s first denuclearised zone, and pioneered a comprehensive inspections system. This article explores Antarctic arms control as past precedent. It finds that the United States, which spearheaded the Antarctic Treaty negotiations, initially rationalised arms control in Antarctica as an isolated endeavour. Yet its potential elsewhere quickly appealed to various officials involved in the treaty negotiations and aligned with public perception. Subsequent initiatives for arms control took broad inspiration from the Antarctic Treaty, but regional differences limited specific adaptations.
“Non-Alignment and Beyond: India’s Interest in Latin America, 1961 – 1972,” Diplomacy & Statecraft, Vol. 29, No. 4 (December 2018): 613–37.
Between 1961 and 1972, Latin America came to capture India’s diplomatic imagination. Officials within India’s Ministry of External Affairs identified strengthened ties with the region as a way to augment, restrain, and transcend the Non-Aligned Movement, further India’s international prestige and political influence, spread Indian culture, and bolster India’s economy. India’s interest in Latin America climaxed after Prime Minister Indira Gandhi prioritised the region and Pakistan strengthened diplomatic relations with Panama in autmn 1967. Yet uncertainty over the internal realities of Latin America hindered any Indian pivot. In the end, India’s aspirations for Latin America failed to materialise.
“Cold Calculations: The United States and the Creation of Antarctica’s Atom-Free Zone,” Diplomatic History, Vol. 42, No. 4 (September 2018): 640–68.
In the autumn of 1959, twelve nations internationalized and demilitarized Antarctica with the creation of the Antarctic Treaty. Two articles of the Antarctic Treaty combined to ban nuclear weapons, nuclear tests, nuclear explosions, and the dispersal of radioactive waste in the continent, making Antarctica the first “atom-free zone” in the world. This article argues that no nation opposed the establishment of Antarctica’s atom-free zone more than the United States, which desired to preserve its right to scientific exploration through the use of “peaceful nuclear explosions” (PNEs). But fearful of the environmental impact of Antarctic PNEs on their populations, southern hemispheric nations pressured the United States to concede on the Antarctic nuclear question. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union’s mercurial behavior over the issue threatened to derail the Antarctic Treaty. Questioning its own rationale for PNEs in Antarctica and desiring to reap Cold War propagandist, geostrategic, and tactical benefits from a completed Antarctic Treaty, in the end the United States foreswore the right to PNEs in the continent.
“‘A Desire so Close to the Hearts of All Latin Americans’: Utopian Ideals and Imperfections Behind Latin America’s Nuclear Weapon Free Zone,” Bulletin of Latin American Research, Vol. 37, No. 2 (April 2018): 160–74.
In April 1969, Latin America implemented the first nuclear weapon free zone (NWFZ) in an inhabited region of the world. This article explores the creation of Latin America's NWFZ as a utopian impulse. It argues that various Latin American states used the utopian ideals of security, sovereignty, and socio-economic prosperity to propel the region's denuclearisation forward. Those implementing these utopian ideals had to define the meaning of Latin America, nuclear weapons under a non-proliferation agreement, and the denuclearisation of an inhabited region. The result was compromise forged from a collision of utopian ideals and dystopian geopolitics.
“‘Generals I Have Fought Just as Many Nuclear Wars as You Have’: Forecasts, Future Scenarios, and the Politics of Armageddon,” (with Matthew Connelly et. al.) American Historical Review, Vol. 117, No. 5 (December 2012): 1431–60.
HISTORIANS HAVE LONG ARGUED THAT ignoring the past or misapplying its lessons can lead to fatal mistakes. But governments have shown far more interest in the promise of prevision. The United States, in particular, has made a massive investment in intelligence estimates, future scenarios, simulations, and technology forecasts since World War II. The sums expended on official history and archives are trifling in comparison.
In some ways, this is an old story. Political leaders sought the advice of oracles and soothsayers long before historians arrived on the scene. What has changed is the tremendous growth in bureaucratic structures that are specifically designed to provide foresight. There has also been a qualitative transformation in the sophistication of forecasting and modeling. The development of official efforts to anticipate future events and trends was a trend in itself, one that has become worldwide in scope. But to the extent that historians have taken any interest in the future, their work tends to center on intellectual and cultural history, especially utopian and dystopian visions, notions about progress and decline, and visual and literary representations of things to come. The political history of what Reinhart Koselleck called “the horizon of expectation” remains largely unexplored.
There is no more important example of the impact of prevision than the United States' preparations for war with the USSR. Whereas conventional war allowed time to adjust to an adversary's strategy and tactics, to redeploy some forces and hold others in reserve, nuclear war was expected to unfold with bewildering speed and violence. Misreading Moscow's intentions could have been catastrophic. U.S. policymakers therefore fought bitterly over both intelligence estimates and war plans, and over what kinds of expertise might substitute for experience. As the young RAND Corporation economist Alain Enthoven pointed out in asserting his own expertise in “systems analysis,” no one—not even the most battle-tested general—had fought even one such war. Civilian and military experts would also seek out the vicarious experience of war games and role-playing exercises, or what was sometimes called synthetic history. In effect, struggles over the fate of the earth would be resolved in a land of make-believe.